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RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION RECONSIDERED*
“Arnheim: […] and nothing irrational happens in world history.
Ulrich: But so much that is irrational happens in the world, surely?
Arnheim: In world history, never!”1
1. Introduction: History of Science versus History of Scientists
Here is a dilemma concerning the history of science. Can the history
of scientific thought be reduced to the history of the beliefs, motives and
actions of scientists? Or should we think of the history of scientific
thought as in some sense independent from the history of scientists?
If the history of scientific thought is just, or is reducible to, the history
of scientists, then it seems that philosophy of science has little to do with the
history of science. It may (and hopefully does) learn from the history of
science, but philosophy in no way does (or should) influence the way history
of science is done. By describing the actions and motives of scientists, as
well as the relevant sociological, institutional, and cultural background, we
get a full picture of the history of science. This approach will have little
patience for some of the classic topics of the philosophical history of
science that dominated the 60s and 70s of the last century, such as the ra-
tionality of theory change.
The other horn of the dilemma would be to claim that the history of
scientific thought is (in some sense) independent from the history of sci-
entists. Taking this route often amounts to interpreting science as a system
of ideas or thoughts that develops according to its own logic and we do
not have to take into consideration the actual actions and motives of indi-
vidual scientists in order to write the history of science.
The aim of this paper is to carve out an intermediate position between
these two. I will argue that the history of scientific thought supervenes on,
but is not reducible to, the history of scientists. There is a legitimate level
of description for analyzing the history of scientific thought that does not
reduce to the individual level of scientists. Yet, every aspect of the history
“Rational Reconstruction Reconsidered” by Bence Nanay,
The Monist, vol, 93, no. 4, pp. 598–617. Copyright © 2010, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.
of scientific thought is determined by the actual motives and actions of in-
dividual scientists.
Maybe surprisingly, I use Imre Lakatos’s controversial concept of the
rational reconstruction of the history of science in order to argue for this
intermediate position. Lakatos is often taken to be one of the most radical
proponents of the second horn of the dilemma I sketched here. I argue that
we can use Lakatos’s theoretical framework to show why we need to take
both the history of scientific thought and the history of scientists seriously
if we want to write history of science. The aim of the paper is to examine how
these two aspects of the history of science can and should be combined.
2. Internal and External History of Science
I talked about the history of scientific thought and the history of sci-
entists above. I will use a less colorful but more precise formulation in
what follows. I will use a distinction between the internal and the external
history of science as these terms are used by Lakatos (Lakatos 1970,
1971). It is important to note that Lakatos’s way of using these terms is
highly idiosyncratic (see Lakatos 1971, 123, n. 1, Hacking 1979, 394,
Hacking 1983, 122)2: it is very different from what intellectual historians
mean by internal and external history (see Shapin 1992 for a good
summary of the many ways this distinction is used by intellectual histori-
ans). I will use Lakatos’s terminology (and not the standard terminology
of intellectual history) in what follows.
Lakatos takes the external history of science to be a socio-psychological
narrative that describes the beliefs, motives, actions, and other mental states
of scientists, together with their institutional background. Internal history,
in contrast, is taken to be a description of the history of scientific thoughts
and ideas and of “objective scientific growth” (Lakatos 1970, 180).
So it seems that every event in the history of science has two descriptions,
an internal and an external one. Take the ‘modern synthesis’ of evolutionary
biology, for example. The external historian would examine the various
intellectual influences of specific scientists, for example, of Ronald Fischer,
Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr, as well as the interactions between
them. The internal historian, in contrast, would talk about the combination
of two scientific theories, Darwin’s theory of natural selection and popu-
lation genetics. The specific scientists and their interactions will not play
any role in this narrative.
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Lakatos has a seemingly extravagant view on the relation between
internal and external history, which I will come back to in the next section.
For now, I would like to give some examples for writing history of science
in a purely external and in a purely internal way. Unsurprisingly, the moral
of the story will be that we need to pay attention to both internal and
external history in order to write any meaningful narrative of the history
of science. The aim of the paper is to analyze how exactly the internal and
the external aspects can and should combine.
It is not too difficult to find examples for external history of science
that ignore (or pay little attention to) internal history as most historians
working in the tradition of ‘sociology of science’ follow this methodolo-
gy. A famous and quite extreme example is Bruno Latour and Stephen
Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979). Latour, who has no training in
molecular biology, spent a couple of years observing the research on
growth hormones in a molecular biology lab at the Salk Institute in San
Diego. In this description of laboratory life, the authors actively and de-
liberately ignored the content of the research that was undertaken in this
lab. Similar (but maybe less radical) methodology has been used in de-
scribing more distant episodes in the history of science (another famous
example is Shapin and Schaffer 1985, see also Shapin 1982 for an
important theoretical/methodological manifesto for the sociology of
science approach).
The sociological approach to the history of science can be, and has
been, used in more or less radical fashion. The one I have been focusing
on here is the more radical version, the one that denies the relevance of
internal history (to which Latour-Woolgar 1979 is a good example). One
problem with this radical version of the sociology of science approach is
that very often ignoring internal considerations makes it very difficult to
describe what is going on in external history. If a theory T implies a claim
C, then if we describe a scientist who accepts T, it is easy to explain why
she holds C with reference to this piece of internal history. If we cannot
use internal history, then the reason why the scientist holds C needs to be
explained in terms of the scientist’s psychological history. This will look
even more difficult if C is not a claim that the scientist holds explicitly, but
rather a claim that she takes for granted because she (explicitly) accepts
T. In this case, internal history can help us to explain why she takes C for
granted, but it is difficult to see how external history alone can do so.
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We have seen an example for using external history only in the
writing of history of science. But what is the other extreme? Can we do
only internal history, ignoring any external considerations?
One example for this purely internalist approach is implied by some
evolutionary approaches of scientific change. It has been suggested that
like evolved organisms, scientific theories also compete for survival and
reproduction: both science and natural selection proceeds by trial and
error. As we can talk about natural selection among organisms and
lineages, we can also talk about selection among scientific theories. There
are various ways of substantiating this evolutionary analogy (some
famous examples include Popper 1959/2002, 1963, 1972, 1975, 1978;
Toulmin 1967, 1970, 1972; Kuhn 1972, 172; Van Fraassen 1980, 39–40;
Hull 1988, 2001; see Bradie 1986 for a typology). But the one that is
relevant for our purposes is the meme theoretical reconstruction of the
history of science (see Hull 1988, 2001; Aunger 2002; Distin 2005).
According to this proposal, the history of science, like other cultural
phenomena, can be explained, at least partially, with the help of the
following evolutionary model: Memes are pieces of information and they
compete for survival in a quite similar way as genes do; the difference is
that they compete for the capacity of our minds. Since the capacity of the
human mind is limited, only some of them, the successful ones, manage
to get into the minds of numerous people, hence, they survive, whereas
the unsuccessful ones die out. A meme can be a tune, the idea of liberal-
ism, or the habit of brushing one’s teeth. Those tunes will survive that can
get into and stay in many minds. The ones that fail to do so will die out
(Dawkins 1989, 1982a, 1982b; Dennett 1995, 2003, 2006). This general
explanatory model can be applied to the history of science as well:
scientific theories are memes: they spread from the mind of one scientist
to the other (David Hull made a very similar proposal in his Hull 1988 and
2001, but see Bechtel 1988, Ghiselin 1988, and Griesemer 1988 for a
variety of objections to his account).
Meme theory in general has been severely criticized (Sperber 1996,
2000; Wimsatt 1999; Richerson-Boyd 2005; Sterelny 2006a, 2006b), but
even if we assume that there are such things as memes and even if we also
assume that we can talk about something like a selection process among
them, the meme theoretical reconstruction of the history of science will
still look somewhat problematic. If the history of science can be described
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in terms of the selection pressures of meme selection, then scientists
themselves are left out of this process altogether. They are the vehicles of
memes at best and the important and explanatory relevant causal relations
are to be found among memes, not scientists. If we take the history of
science to be the history of memes, then this gives us an example of purely
internal history that ignores any external factors. The history of science, in-
terpreted this way, bypasses scientists.3
The aim of this section was not to give knock-down arguments
against certain branches of the sociology of science or against the meme-
theoretical approach to the history of science. I introduced these two
examples and pointed out some of their problematic features because they
signify the two extremes of writing history of science. It seems that
neither ignoring internal history nor ignoring external history leads to an
unproblematic historiographic approach. The unsurprising conclusion is
that if we want an unproblematic methodology for writing history of
science, we need to combine the two. How exactly this could and should
be done is the question I now turn to.
3. Rational Reconstruction
Imre Lakatos is often considered to be the champion of internal
history and of the ruthless dismissal of external considerations. I aim to
show that Lakatos in fact urges an interesting combination of internal and
external history.
According to Lakatos, the first step of writing a history of science
must be the reconstruction of internal history. This is the step Lakatos
calls ‘rational reconstruction’ (Popper also talks about the rational recon-
struction of the history of science; it is unclear who inherited this concept
from whom, see e.g., Popper 1972, 179). As Lakatos says, “whatever
problem the historian of science wishes to solve, he has first to reconstruct
the relevant section of the growth of objective scientific knowledge, that
is, the relevant section of ‘internal history’” (Lakatos 1971, 106). What he
means by rational reconstruction is perhaps more appropriately described
as rational construction: there is no guarantee that the rationally recon-
structed internal history will correspond to the actual historical facts.
Lakatos explicitly acknowledges this: “Internal history is not just a
selection of methodologically interpreted facts: it may be, on occasions,
their radically improved versions (Lakatos 1970, 106).4 In other words,
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rational reconstruction distorts what we know to be the historical facts and
this gives rise to internal history.
Lakatos’s writings are full of provocative claims about just how
distorted this internal history will look. Here is the most famous (or,
rather, infamous) quote:
One way to indicate discrepancies between history and its rational recon-
struction is to relate the internal history in the text and indicate in the
footnotes how actual history ‘misbehaved’ in the light of its rational recon-
struction. (Lakatos 1971, 107)5
This quote as well as Lakatos’s general seemingly dismissive attitude towards
what he calls ‘actual history’ triggered very strong reactions both from
philosophers and from historians. Thomas Kuhn writes that “What Lakatos
conceives as history is not history at all but philosophy fabricating examples”
(Kuhn 1971, 143). Or, more precisely,
A historian would not include in his narrative a factual report which he
knows to be false. If he had done so, he would be so sensitive to the offence
that he could not conceivably compose a footnote calling attention to it.
(Kuhn 1970, 256)
Larry Laudan’s reaction is equally strong: according to him, Lakatos’s
methodology is “consciously and deliberately falsifying the historical
record” (Laudan 1977, 170). Gerald Holton is even more negative when
he writes about Lakatos’s rational reconstruction of Bohr’s early work,
which he considers to be “an ahistorical parody that makes one’s hair
stand on end” (Holton 1978, 106, see also Holton 1974, 75). These are not
isolated examples, see also Godfrey-Smith 2003, 103–104; Koertge 1976;
Richardson 2006; Holton 1978, 105–107; McMullin 1970).
Before dismissing Lakatos as a bad historian of science and dismissing
Lakatos’s vision of history of science as either ahistorical or crazy, it is im-
portant to remember that rational reconstruction for Lakatos is just the first
step of writing history of science. It is not the end of the story. Internal history
is not the finished product of what historians are supposed to do, but only
the first, preparatory stage. Lakatos is so explicit about this that it is
striking how many historians and philosophers misinterpreted his account.
For Lakatos, the first step of rational reconstruction needs to be
followed by a second phase where “one tries to compare this rational re-
construction with actual history and to criticize both one’s rational recon-
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struction for lack of historicity and the actual history for lack of rational-
ity” (Lakatos 1970, 138, n. 40). Or, as he reiterates, “any rational
reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical
(socio-psychological) ‘external theory’” (Lakatos 1971, 91). This is not a
passing remark, but the summary of the third of the three main claims he
argues for in (Lakatos 1971). In short, the history of science is not
identical to its internal history (that is, its rational reconstruction). Lakatos
is not a radical internalist. In fact, he is very much against radical inter-
nalism. As he says, “since external influences always exist, radical
internalism is utopian” (Lakatos 1971, 94). According to him, writing
history of science requires attention to both internal and external history
as well as to the interaction between the two: “history of science is always
richer than its rational reconstruction” (Lakatos 1971, 105).
But if this is true, then how should we interpret his provocative
remark about writing internal history in the main text and exile external
history to the footnotes? Lakatos, somewhat defensively, describes the
infamous passage about footnotes as “a rather unsuccessful joke”
(Lakatos 1976/1978, 192) and adds that “of course such parodies may be
written, and may even be instructive; but I never said that this is the way
in which history actually ought to be written and, indeed, I never wrote
history in this way” (ibid). In short, rather than dismissing external
history, “Lakatos merely suggests a colourful way of doing something
quite orthodox” (Musgrave 1983, 66. See also the similarly charitable in-
terpretation of Brown 1989, 109–111; Hacking 1979, 396, 1983, 125).6
So if we follow Lakatos, we need both internal and external history
in order to write a history of science (and we should only joke about dis-
missing the latter into footnotes). But how do these two aspects of history
relate to one another? Lakatos finds it important to emphasize a number
of times that internal history is primary and external history is secondary
(see, e.g., Lakatos 1971, 92, 105). Why? Because “the most important
problems of external history are defined by internal history” (Lakatos
1971, 105, see also Lakatos 1976/1978, 191 and Lakatos 1971, 92 for
similar formulations). Or, to use his telling metaphor, “the internal
skeleton of rational history defines the external problems” (Lakatos
1976/1978, 191).
In other words, internal history is far from being the history of science.
It is only the skeleton of history of science and a lot of work needs to be
done to get from the skeleton to the full body of history of science (see,
e.g., Lakatos 1971, 118, Lakatos 1976/1978, 191–92). Nonetheless, although
internal history is merely the skeleton of the history of science, it is
necessary to have this skeleton to build on. Internal history is a necessary
ingredient of any serious history of science (see Lakatos 1976/1978, 192).
One may wonder why Lakatos takes internal history to be so
important. The answer has to do with the fact that the aim here is to
explain the history of science, a mainly rational social enterprise, which
needs to be kept separate from the history of other social phenomena. In
other words it is in order to preserve the special status of science that we
need to use rational reconstructions. Doing without rational reconstruction
would make “scientific change a kind of religious change” (Lakatos 1970,
93). And this “would vindicate, no doubt unintentionally, the basic
political credo of contemporary religious maniacs” (ibid).
It is time to summarize what we have learned from Lakatos about the
ways in which internal and external history could and should be
combined. For Lakatos, we need both. If we ignore internal history, then
we lose what is special about science. And this is exactly what certain
branches of the sociology of science do. Lakatos has little patience for this
approach: “The work of those ‘externalists’ (mostly trendy ‘sociologists
of science’) who claim to do social history of some scientific discipline
without having mastered the discipline itself, and its internal history, is
worthless” (Lakatos 1971, 128, n. 68).
But Lakatos also holds that external history should not be ignored
either. This is especially clear from his criticism of Stephen Toulmin’s
writings (see, also, Nanay forthcoming).7 Toulmin insisted that evolution
should be more than a mere metaphor when we describe the progress of
science (Toulmin 1970, 560–64, see also Toulmin 1972). It is not enough
to compare the trial and error method of science to the trial and error
method of natural selection. The evolutionary model is indeed explanato-
ry (Toulmin 1967, 470): selection among scientific theories explains some
of the features of these theories, most importantly, their survival.
Lakatos’s main problem with Toulmin’s account is that this selectionist
explanation bypasses scientists and philosophers, very much like the
cunning of Hegelian reason. In other words, he seems to be criticizing
Toulmin for ignoring external history—something Lakatos himself is
often—as I tried to show, mistakenly—accused of.8
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In other words, Lakatos holds that both internal and external history
are indispensable. And he has an account of how the two are related:
internal history is logically prior to external history: historians of science
should first give a rationally reconstructed internal history and then give
the external history on the basis of that. In order to substantiate this account,
we need to examine how exactly external history presupposes internal history
and we also need to examine some thorny ontological questions about the
entities internal history is about.
4. Why Do We Need Rational Reconstruction?
It is time to depart from the specifics of Lakatos’s account of rational
reconstruction and examine how the concept of rational reconstruction
could be made plausible, regardless of what Lakatos said about it. And, in
fact, Lakatos did not give a full account of how rational reconstruction is
supposed to work. More precisely, he never tells us why and how internal
history sets the problems for external history. As Larry Laudan rightly
points out, “Lakatos nowhere establishes the necessity (or the desirabili-
ty) of making a reconstruction of the past which involves an intentional
warping of the historical record” (Laudan 1977, 170). Lakatos gives a lot
of extravagant metaphorical claims about the necessity of internal history
for writing history of science. Perhaps the most famous of these is the
second half of his Kantian paraphrase: “Philosophy of science without
history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of
science is blind” (Lakatos 1971, 91). But Laudan’s criticism is absolutely
correct: Lakatos never give any reason why the rational reconstruction is
necessary for writing history of science.
Here is one reason why we could think that rational reconstruction is
a necessary feature of writing history of science. Explanation is always
contrastive: explaining why x is F rather than G is a different explanato-
ry task from explaining why x, rather than y, is F (Van Fraassen 1980,
142–43). In other words, explanation is always relative to a contrast class.
I am assuming that the same is true for historical explanations.
But then the question is what allows the historian of science to
identify the contrast class for her historical explanations. What contrast
classes are worth taking into consideration and what are not? My answer
is that the contrast class of explanations in the history of science comes
from the rational reconstruction of internal history. And this is the sense
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in which external history presupposes the rational reconstruction of
internal history.
Here is an example. Many historians of biology have been trying to
explain why Darwin attributed so much importance to Henry Charles
Fleeming Jenkin’s objection to his theory of natural selection (Gould
1991; Bulmer 2004; Morris 1994; Bowler 1983, 1988, 1990; Bulmer
2003, 141–45; Cookson and Hempstead 2000). Jenkin’s paper was
published in 1867 and two years later, Darwin wrote that “Fleeming
Jenkin has given me much trouble, but has been more real use to me than
any other essay or review” (letter to Joseph Hooker, in Darwin-Seward
1903, vol. 2, 379. See also a similar claim in his letter to Alfred Russel
Wallace also in 1869). Jenkin’s objection about blending inheritance
became perhaps the most important criticism of The Origin of Species and
even of the theory of natural selection in general (before the ‘modern syn-
thesis’) (see Hull 1973 and Vorzimmer 1963, 1970 for summaries). Stated
very simplistically, the objection is that natural selection cannot explain
real evolutionary change as, because of the ‘blending’ nature of inheri-
tance, variations from the average will be watered down to be closer to the
average in the next generation. The question is: why did Darwin take
Jenkin’s objection to be so important?
How should the external historian begin to address this question?
The first thing they should do (and many historians in fact do) is to see
how good Jenkin’s objection really is and what aspect of Darwin’s theory
it jeopardized. The standard interpretation of Jenkin’s objection is that it
made it clear that Darwin was using a mistaken theory of inheritance (the
‘blending’ theory) and as long as we take inheritance to be blending the
traits of the two parents, then Jenkin is correct to point out that natural
selection will not be able to explain major evolutionary change (see, for
example Lewontin 1986). This interpretation of Jenkin’s argument is con-
sistent with the textbook narrative of the significance of the ‘modern
synthesis’ that replaced Darwin’s original concept of inheritance in the
theory of natural selection with a Mendelian one. Thus, Darwin was right
to take Jenkin’s criticism seriously.
But here is an alternative interpretation. Ernst Mayr argues convinc-
ingly that Jenkin’s paper is deeply confused and it does not present any
good objection (Mayr 1982, 512–14, see also Kitcher 2007, 73–75, who
also nicely exposes the racist undertones of Jenkin’s paper). Mayr argues
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that Jenkin failed to grasp what is, according to Mayr, the most important
element of Darwin’s theory, what he labels ‘population thinking’: the
view that in the biological domain individual variation cannot be ignored
and subsumed under some fixed and preexisting type. Individual variation
is what drives evolution and we can only talk about types that these vari-
ations are instantiations of as statistical abstractions (Mayr 1959/1996, see
also Sober 1980 and Nanay forthcoming a). Jenkin assumes that variation
is always variation within a type. According to Mayr, this is an instance of
the ‘typological thinking’ or essentialism that Darwin was strongly opposed
to. Thus, Mayr concludes, Jenkin misunderstood the most important claim
of the theory of natural selection. Darwin could have easily refuted him,
but he didn’t. In other words, Darwin was completely mistaken to take
Jenkin’s criticism seriously (see esp. Mayr 1982, 514).
We have two different historical explanations for Darwin’s assess-
ment of Jenkin’s argument. What matters for our purposes is not which
one is correct, but in what way they differ. They differ in as much as they
give different rational reconstructions of the internal history of the
Darwinian revolution. And, as a result, the external historical narrative
will also look very different.
If we accept Mayr’s explanation and claim that Darwin was wrong to
take Jenkin’s criticism seriously, then we also need to interpret the related
changes Darwin made in later editions of The Origin of Species (espe-
cially on p. 72 of the 1872 edition of The Origin of Species) as
insignificant (see, e.g., Vorzimmer 1963, 1970). And if we accept his in-
terpretation, then this sets the agenda for future historical research: the
next question the external historian should ask is why was Darwin so
mistaken about the vulnerability of his own theory in the face of Jenkin’s
objection? Mayr’s (sketchy) answer is that it is because he was “rather
confused on the topic of variation” (Mayr 1982, 514, see also 681–97).
If, in contrast, we accept the standard narrative about Jenkin’s
criticism, then the changes Darwin made in the later editions will be con-
sidered to be very significant indeed. The agenda for future historical
research will also look very different: the next step is likely to involve the
understanding of the reasons why Darwin was mistaken about inheritance.
Crucially, what constitutes the difference between these two (external)
historical explanations is the way in which Darwin’s theory is being ra-
tionally reconstructed. For Mayr, the crucial element of this theory is
population thinking. That is why, according to Mayr, Darwin should have
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dismissed Jenkin’s objection without thinking twice about it. According to
the standard interpretation, however, Darwin’s mistaken ideas about in-
heritance are part of the most central Darwinian claims (to be contrasted
with the correct ideas of the ‘modern synthesis’). Thus, the two historical
explanations differ in what they take to be what Lakatos would call the
‘hard core’ and the ‘protective belt’ of Darwin’s theory. This is a differ-
ence in internal history. And, as we have seen, depending on how we
rationally reconstruct this internal history, we get different directions for
future (external) historical research. Further, depending on how we ratio-
nally reconstruct internal history, the course of external history, for
example, the change of Darwin’s thinking between the earlier and the later
editions of The Origin of Species, will also look different.
The aim of this brief case study was to show that the rational recon-
struction of internal history is presupposed by the writing of external
history. Mayr’s and the standard historical explanation differ in the as-
sessment of the ‘hard core’ of Darwin’s theory, and, as a result, ask
different questions about the influence of Jenkin’s criticism on Darwin’s
thinking. This means that they use different contrast classes when they ask
why Darwin took Jenkin’s criticism seriously. Mayr asks why Darwin
took it seriously, rather than just dismissed it as a piece of old essentialist
typological thinking. The standard account asks why Darwin was forced
to take Jenkin’s criticism seriously, rather than having a theory of inheri-
tance that would not have made his theory to be susceptible to it. And as
a result of this difference in the contrast class of the historical explanation,
the course of external history of the Jenkin-Darwin episode (as well as the
further questions it raises) will also be very different. As Lakatos said,
“the most important problems of external history are defined by internal
history” (Lakatos 1971, 105).
5. Ontological Worries about Rational Reconstruction
In the last section I departed from Lakatos’s concept of rational re-
construction to show that it is a necessary feature of writing history of
science. In this section I depart from Lakatos even further: I question
some ontological assumptions he made about the nature of (rationally re-
constructed) internal history.
External history is about scientists, their beliefs, motives and actions.
But what is internal history about? The official formulation is that it is
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about the growth of knowledge, in fact, the growth of objective knowledge.
But what kind of entities does internal history presuppose?
Lakatos makes it very clear that internal history is not about the sci-
entists’ beliefs, motives and actions. As he writes, “the internal historian
will not need to take any interest whatsoever in the persons involved, or
in their beliefs about their own activities” (Lakatos 1971, 127, footnote
60, see also Lakatos 1971, 106).
Note that this is an epistemic claim: if we are interested in the history
of scientific thought, we need to describe the history of science in such a
way that would not need to refer to the beliefs, motives and actions of sci-
entists. But Lakatos goes further and seems to alsomake an ontological claim:
The—rationally reconstructed—growth of science takes place essentially in
the world of ideas, in Plato’s and Popper’s third world, in the world of articulated
knowledge which is independent of knowing subjects. (Lakatos 1970, 180)
Lakatos makes it clear a number of times that internal history is part of
Popper’s third world (Lakatos 1976/1978, 191, Lakatos 1971, 179). But
what does he (or Popper) mean by the third world? According to Popper,
“the third world is man-made and, in a very clear sense, superhuman at the
same time. It transcends its makers” (Popper 1968/1972, 159). Further, it
seems to have causal powers, independent of the causal powers of the
second world (ibid.)
Lakatos is somewhat ambiguous about how demanding an interpre-
tation of the third world he embraces. In the quote above (and elsewhere)
he seems to equate the third world with the heaven of Platonic Forms. As
he says in one of his last papers, “the third world is the Platonic world of
objective spirit“ (Lakatos 1976, 128). Elsewhere, however, he takes the
third world to be the world of propositions: “the ‘first world’ is that of
matter, the ‘second’ the world of feelings, beliefs, consciousness, the ‘third’
the world of objective knowledge, articulated in propositions” (Lakatos
1971, 127, footnote 61). It is also unclear whether he follows Popper in at-
tributing causal powers to the entities of the third world. But what matters
for our purposes is that for Lakatos, as for Popper, there is an important
ontological difference between scientific thoughts and the thoughts of sci-
entists. According to Lakatos, rational reconstruction gives us ‘third
world’ entities: entities that are “not dependent in the slightest on the sci-
entists’ beliefs, personalities or authority” (Lakatos 1971, 106). Much of
the discussion about Lakatos’s concept of rational reconstruction takes
this ontological independence of internal history for granted, whether or
not they side with Lakatos (see, e.g., Elkana 1974, 245; Kulka 1977, 331).
Should we follow Lakatos in these ontological claims? Some
defenders of Lakatos’s concept of rational reconstruction have embraced
his claims about the ‘third world’ (notably Palmer 1993). But I agree with
Ian Hacking that these claims about the ontology of internal history are
part of the reason why Lakatos’s concept of rational reconstruction has
often been treated with suspicion. As Hacking says, “Lakatos’s internal
history is [. . .], in short, to be a history of Hegelian alienated knowledge,
the history of anonymous and autonomous research programmes”
(Hacking 1983, 122). Hacking’s words may seem too strong (especially in
the light of Lakatos’s criticism of Toulmin for his excessive Hegelian
vision of history), but some of Lakatos’s early writings seem to show that
Hacking was right. Here is what Lakatos says in Proofs and Refutations:
Mathematical activity is human activity. Certain aspects of this activity—as
of any human activity—can be studied by psychology, others by history. [. . .]
But mathematical activity produces mathematics. Mathematics, this product
of human activity, ‘alienates itself’ from the human activity which has been
producing it. It becomes a living growing organism that acquires a certain
autonomy from the activity which has produced it. (Lakatos 1963/1964, 146)
Thinking of objective knowledge as ‘a living growing organism’ sounds
Hegelian indeed, which, for some philosophers, may disqualify Lakatos’s
account of rational reconstruction altogether. The question is whether we
can depart from Lakatos’s claims about the ontological independence of
internal history and give an account of rational reconstruction that does
not rely on such hints of Hegelianism.
My claim is that we can and in fact should discard Lakatos’s claims
about the ‘third world’ and about the ontological independence of internal
history in order to arrive at a plausible interpretation of rational recon-
struction. We can think of internal history as being ontologically dependent
on the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of scientists, yet, we can also treat it
as irreducible to these psychological facts. The proposal is that internal
history supervenes on the history of the beliefs, motives and actions of
scientists, but it is irreducible to them.
And this is in fact what the analysis of the reasons why we should
talk about internal history at all, which I have outlined above, suggests.
Recall that we considered two historical explanations of the Darwin/Jenkin
episode. The difference between them was a difference in the rational re-
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construction of internal history. According to Mayr’s interpretation, the
hard core of Darwin’s theory is population thinking. And this sets the
agenda for the explanations of, and future problems for, external history.
The question is: what is this entity, Darwin’s theory that Mayr makes
claims about? Is it an entity ontologically independent from Darwin’s
beliefs? Or is it just the sum total of Darwin’s beliefs? I think that the only
plausible answer is that what Mayr (or any internal historian) refers to
when talking about Darwin’s theory is not ontologically independent from
Darwin’s beliefs, but neither is it reducible to them. The internal historian
cannot take Darwin’s theory to be ontologically independent of Darwin’s
beliefs (say, by taking it to be an ‘ideal’ theory of evolution) as many
aspects of this theory clearly depend on the contingent beliefs Darwin
happened to have, say, about the nature of inheritance (which were far
from ideal). Nor should the internal historian take Darwin’s theory as the
sum total of, or as reducible to, Darwin’s beliefs. Mayr himself admits that
Darwin was not entirely consistent in his treatment of population thinking
and that he often fell back to typologist terminology (see, e.g., Mayr 1982,
488). Yet, the internal historian, according to Mayr, should treat popula-
tion thinking as part of the hard core of Darwin’s theory. Darwin’s
rationally reconstructed theory differs from Darwin’s actual beliefs. But
Darwin’s rationally reconstructed theory is still Darwin’s theory, a theory
attributed to a specific person in the history of science. Thus, close exam-
ination of the role internal history plays in the writing of history of science
reveals that internal history should not be taken to be ontologically inde-
pendent from the scientists’ beliefs, motives and actions, but they should
not be taken to be reducible to these either.
Take another example that was mentioned above: the ‘modern syn-
thesis’ of evolutionary theory. We have seen that when the internal
historian talks about this chapter in the history of biology, she does not
examine the beliefs and correspondence of Ronald Fischer, Theodosius
Dobzhansky, and Ernst Mayr. The internal historian would talk about the
combination of two scientific theories, Darwin’s theory of natural
selection and population genetics. She will not worry too much about the
specific scientists and their interactions. In other words, internal history
should be given at a level of description that is not reducible to the level
of description of the beliefs of scientists.
But this does not imply that internal history is ontologically inde-
pendent from the beliefs, motives and actions of scientists. When we
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describe the shape and size of solid middle-sized physical objects, like my
desk, we do not pay too much attention to the level of subatomic particles.
Yet, my desk is composed of these subatomic particles. Similarly, the
internal history of the ‘modern synthesis’ supervenes on the history of the
beliefs, motives, and actions of specific scientists. If the history of the
‘modern synthesis’ had been different, the history of the beliefs, motives,
and actions of Fischer, Mayr, or others would have had to be also
different. Yet, we can describe the history of the ‘modern synthesis’ as the
unification of two scientific ideas without any reference to the beliefs,
motives, and actions of any scientists.
Thus, we do not have to posit new entities in a Popperian ‘third
world’ or in a Platonic heaven in order to give a rational reconstruction.
Remember that rational reconstruction is supposed to provide a necessary
ingredient for any history of science and, as I argued, it is supposed to set
the contrast class for any external historical explanations. It is difficult to
see how Platonic Forms would be able to do this. My more straightfor-
ward (and more parsimonious) suggestion is that internal history is about
entities that supervene on (but are irreducible to) the beliefs, motives,
decisions, and actions of the actual scientists.
6. Conclusion: Nonreductive Monism about the History of Science
We have arrived at a picture of the relation between internal and
external history that could be described as nonreductive monism. Internal
history is not ontologically independent from external history. But it
cannot be reduced to external history either.
An obvious analogy for this way of thinking about the relation
between internal and external history comes from philosophy of mind
(Hacking 1983, 124 and Hacking 1979, 393 alludes to the same analogy
briefly). According to nonreductive monist theories of the mind, mental
states supervene on, but are irreducible to brain states (just one example:
Davidson 1970). We could think of the history of science in a similar
nonreductive monist manner.
In fact, we can take this analogy further. One could argue that the
best way of analyzing mental phenomena is to look at both the levels of
beliefs, desires, attention, etc. and the level of patterns of neural activa-
tions and especially the way in which the two levels interact. But it is
difficult to see how that is to be done if beliefs and desires are ontologi-
cally independent from patterns of neural activations. The same could be
said of the best way of analyzing the history of science: it should look at
both internal and external history. And here we have to agree with Lakatos
again, whose dictum is that “both historians and philosophers of science
must make the best of the critical interplay between internal and external
factors” (Lakatos 1971, 122).
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
University of Cambridge
NOTES
* I have written much of this material while I was Lakatos Research Fellow at the
London School of Economics in 2008. I am grateful for the support of LSE as well as of
John Worrall, Miklos Redei, and Alex Bellamy. I am also grateful for comments by Gábor
Zemplén and the members of my seminar on this material at the Universty of British
Columbia in 2009.
1. Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities, New York: Random House, 1995, 185.
2. I am fairly certain that Lakatos’s idiosyncratic use of the terminology of internal
and external history comes from Heinrich Wölfflin’s Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe
(1915), where this distinction applies to the history of art.
3. Note that some uses of the selectionist explanation of scientific change that do not
help themselves to the concept of meme are also subject to the same criticism. See espe-
cially Stephen Toulmin’s evolutionary account (Toulmin 1967, 1972 and esp. 1970,
560–64).
4. This may sound a lot like Professor Arnheim’s provocative statement in Robert
Musil’s The Man without Qualities that “nothing irrational happens in the history of the
world” (chapter 43). As we shall see, Lakatos’s claim is significantly less crazy.
5. Lakatos reiterates this idea about relegating actual history to the footnotes three
times in one page on Lakatos 1971, 106–107.
6. Lakatos does add that he did write history this way on one occasion, namely, in
Lakatos 1963/1964, where his “purpose was to distill a methodological message from the
history, rather than to write history itself.” This may sound like a good excuse, but in
Lakatos 1971 (footnote 64), he confesses that he also used this way of writing history in
Lakatos 1970, 138, 140, 146. It is difficult to decide whether Lakatos’s dismissal of his
earlier footnote comment as a joke was genuine or merely a post hoc excuse.
7. The most detailed account of Lakatos’s problems with Toulmin’s evolutionary ex-
planation is in Lakatos: “Toulmin’s Wittgensteinian epicycles” (manuscript in the Lakatos
archive, file number 8/4). For a shorter summary, see Lakatos 1976, 137–38.
8. See also his letter to Jon Cohen, who reviewed Toulmin’s book in the British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (which Lakatos edited) in 1972. Lakatos here ex-
plicitly agrees with Cohen’s criticism of Toulmin’s Darwinism (Lakatos to Jon Cohen,
October 22, 1972, Lakatos archive, file number 13/166).
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